THE COGNITIVE SCIENCE OF LEGAL
REASONING
This directed reading explores the nature,
process, and structure of legal reasoning for students interested in
this form of thinking and/or in a legal career. A cognitive
science perspective is adopted which focuses of the computational
process underlying legal reasoning. The focus of this cognitive
analysis are on computational processes which is unique and distinct
from everyday reasoning including a characterization of expertise in
legal reasoning and attention to analogical, adductive, and
counterfactual inferences.
Week 1: INTRODUCTION
Levi, E. (1949).
An introduction to legal reasoning (Chap. 1). Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.
Week 3: THE COGNITIVE PSYCHOLOGY OF LEGAL
REASONING
Spellman, B. (2004).
Reflections of a recovering
lawyer: How becoming a cognitive psychologist -- and (in particular)
studying analogical and causal reasoning -- changed my views about
the field of psychology and law."
Chicago-Kent Law Review, 79,
1187-1215.
Spellman, B., & Schauer, F., (2012).
Legal reasoning. In K.
J. Holyoak and R. G. Morrison Jr. (Ed.), The Cambridge Handbook
of Thinking and Reasoning (2nd Edition). New York: Cambridge
University Press.
Rissland , E. L., (1990). Artificial
intelligence and law: Stepping stones to a model of legal reasoning.
Yale Law Journal, 99, 1957-1981
Susskind, R.E. (1986). Expert systems in
law: A jurisprudential approach to artificial intelligence and legal
reasoning. The Modern Law Review, 49, 168-194.
Week 5: EXPERTISE IN LEGAL REASONING
Holmström-Hintikka, G. (1995). Evidence, experts
and legal reasoning. Communication & Cognition, 28(1),
7-36
Nievelstein, F., van Gog, T., Boshuizen, H. A., &
Prins, F. J. (2008). Expertise-related differences in conceptual and
ontological knowledge in the legal domain. European Journal of
Cognitive Psychology, 20, 1043-1064.
Nievelstein, F., van Gog, T., Boshuizen, H. A., &
Prins, F. J. (2010). Effects of conceptual knowledge and
availability of information sources on law students’ legal
reasoning. Instructional Science, 38, 23-35.
Week 7: COUNTERFACTUAL THINKING
Amsel, E., Langer, R., &
Loutzenhiser, L. (1991).
Do lawyers reason differently from
psychologists? A comparative design for studying expertise. In R. J.
Sternberg, P. A. Frensch (Eds.) , Complex problem solving:
Principles and mechanisms (pp. 223-250). Hillsdale, NJ England:
Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.
Spellman, P., & Kincannon, A. (2001).
The relation between counterfactual (“but for”) and causal
reasoning: Experimental findings and implications for jurors’
decisions. Duke Journal of Law and Contemporary Problems,
64, 241-264.
Week 9: ANALOGICAL THINKING
Farrar, J (February, 2009). Reasoning by
analogy in the law. Paper presented at the ‘Judicial
Reasoning: Art or Science ?’ Conference, National Judicial College
of Australia/ ANU College of Law/Australian Academy of Forensic
Sciences
Marchant, G., Robinson, J. P., Anderson, U., &
Schadewald, M. (1991). Analogical transfer and expertise in legal
reasoning. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes,
48, 272-290.
Marchant, G., Robinson, J., Anderson, U., &
Schadewald, M. (1993). The use of analogy in legal argument: Problem
similarity, precedent, and expertise. Organizational Behavior and
Human Decision Processes, 55, 95-119.
Week 11: ABDUCTIVE THINKING
Gordon, T. F. (1991). An abductive theory of legal
issues. International Journal of Man-Machine Studies, 35(1),
95-118. |