THE COGNITIVE SCIENCE OF LEGAL REASONING

This directed reading explores the nature, process, and structure of legal reasoning for students interested in this form of thinking and/or in a legal career.  A cognitive science perspective is adopted which focuses of the computational process underlying legal reasoning. The focus of this cognitive analysis are on computational processes which is unique and distinct from everyday reasoning including a characterization of expertise in legal reasoning and attention to analogical, adductive, and counterfactual inferences.

 

Week 1:  INTRODUCTION

Levi, E. (1949).  An introduction to legal reasoning (Chap. 1).  Chicago, IL:  University of Chicago Press.

 

Week 3:  THE COGNITIVE PSYCHOLOGY OF LEGAL REASONING

Spellman, B. (2004). Reflections of a recovering lawyer: How becoming a cognitive psychologist -- and (in particular) studying analogical and causal reasoning -- changed my views about the field of psychology and law." Chicago-Kent Law Review, 79, 1187-1215.

Spellman, B., & Schauer, F., (2012).  Legal reasoning. In K. J. Holyoak and R. G. Morrison Jr. (Ed.), The Cambridge Handbook of Thinking and Reasoning (2nd Edition). New York: Cambridge University Press.

Rissland , E. L., (1990).  Artificial intelligence and law: Stepping stones to a model of legal reasoning. Yale Law Journal, 99, 1957-1981

Susskind, R.E. (1986).  Expert systems in law: A jurisprudential approach to artificial intelligence and legal reasoning. The Modern Law Review, 49, 168-194.

 

Week 5: EXPERTISE IN LEGAL REASONING

Holmström-Hintikka, G. (1995). Evidence, experts and legal reasoning. Communication & Cognition, 28(1), 7-36

Nievelstein, F., van Gog, T., Boshuizen, H. A., & Prins, F. J. (2008). Expertise-related differences in conceptual and ontological knowledge in the legal domain. European Journal of Cognitive Psychology, 20, 1043-1064.

Nievelstein, F., van Gog, T., Boshuizen, H. A., & Prins, F. J. (2010). Effects of conceptual knowledge and availability of information sources on law students’ legal reasoning. Instructional Science, 38, 23-35.

 

Week 7:  COUNTERFACTUAL THINKING

Amsel, E., Langer, R., & Loutzenhiser, L. (1991). Do lawyers reason differently from psychologists? A comparative design for studying expertise. In R. J. Sternberg, P. A. Frensch (Eds.) , Complex problem solving: Principles and mechanisms (pp. 223-250). Hillsdale, NJ England: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.

Spellman, P., & Kincannon, A. (2001).  The relation between counterfactual (“but for”) and causal reasoning: Experimental findings and implications for jurors’ decisions.  Duke Journal of Law and Contemporary Problems, 64, 241-264.

 

Week 9:  ANALOGICAL THINKING

Farrar, J (February, 2009). Reasoning by analogy in the law.  Paper presented at the ‘Judicial Reasoning: Art or Science ?’ Conference, National Judicial College of Australia/ ANU College of Law/Australian Academy of Forensic Sciences

Marchant, G., Robinson, J. P., Anderson, U., & Schadewald, M. (1991). Analogical transfer and expertise in legal reasoning. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 48, 272-290.

Marchant, G., Robinson, J., Anderson, U., & Schadewald, M. (1993). The use of analogy in legal argument: Problem similarity, precedent, and expertise. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 55, 95-119.

 

Week 11:  ABDUCTIVE THINKING

Gordon, T. F. (1991). An abductive theory of legal issues. International Journal of Man-Machine Studies, 35(1), 95-118.