Running head: THE CARD NOT CHOSEN

  The card not chosen:  
The development of judgments of regret in self and others
Eric Amsel
Weber State University
Michelle Robbins, Tobias Tumarkin
Vassar College
 Adrian Janit, Shara Foulkes, & J. David Smalley
Weber State University

Author’s Address:	Eric Amsel
Department of Psychology
Weber State University
1202 University Circle
Ogden UT 84408-1202
E-mail: Eamsel@weber.edu
Phone: (801) 626-6658

	Abstract
Four studies assessed the development of children’s judgments of emotions experienced when actual states of affairs are found to be less or more desired compared to possible states which could have been realized but were not.  In each study, children and adults judged others’ (Studies 1, 2, & 4) or their own (Studies 3 & 4) feelings about true states of affairs before and after discovering counterfactual states that could have been realized. Half the time, the counterfactual states of affairs were more desired than the actual one and half the time they were less desired.  Few preschoolers showed ability to judge emotional significance of counterfactual information in others or experience it in themselves, which emerged together among 6-year-olds. The difficulty young children were having was not due to problems (a) representing or reasoning about possible states of affair (Studies 1 and 3), (b) updating emotional judgments (Studies 2 and 4),  (c) appreciating the role of psychological factors in emotions (Study 4), or (d) answering the same question twice (Studies 3 and 4).  Rather, we propose that, over age, children become willing, able, and cognizant of the value of bringing the possible world to bear when judging their own or others’ feelings about the actual world.  The implications of the present findings for the development of a range of abilities in childhood, from symbolic play to causal reasoning, are discussed, as is the importance of regret as a quintessential counterfactual emotion in parental regulation of children’s behavior.

		The card not chosen:   
The development of judgments of regret in self and others
As parents and teachers, we sometimes say things to children that are designed to make them feel sad when bad things happen.  For example, a soccer coach was once overheard exclaiming in less than a calm voice to his 4-year-old defender, “If only you had played your position, they wouldn’t have scored.”  The comment was designed for the child not only to feel sad about the true or actual state of affairs of his team being scoring upon, but also to regret his actions. Regret has been defined as a sense of sorrow, disappointment, or distress over something done or not done (Landman, 1987).  The coach’s comment invites the child to compare actual states of affairs to an unrealized or counterfactual possibility of the child having played his position and the goal not having been scored. Such a comparison between more desired counterfactual states of affairs that could have occurred and less desired actual states that have occurred is a basis for judging regret in others and experiencing it oneself (Amsel & Smalley, 2000; Gleicher, Kost, Baker, Strathman, Richman, & Sherman, 1990; Gilovich & Medvec, 1995, Kahneman & Tversky, 1982; Kahneman & Miller, 1986; Landman, 1987; Roese, 1997; Zeelenberg, van Dijk, & Manstead, 1998, 2000).  

While appearing mean-spirited, the coach’s comment was perhaps motivated by a noble enough goal: to make sure that under similar circumstances in the future the child does not make the same mistake again. In this sense, the experience of regret can be an adaptive learning experience (Amsel, Bowden, Cottrell, & Sullivan, in press; Roese, 1994; Zeelenberg, 1999).  Presumably a person feeling sufficient regret regarding how his or her actions contributed to an undesired outcome will learn not to act in the same way again in the same conditions. Indeed, having children learn from their experience may motivate many parents’ attempts to induce regret in children in all kinds of settings. Comments of the form, “If only you had done A, B would not have happened,” induces regret by inviting the child to compare an actual state of affairs where undesirable outcome B occurred and the child did not do A, with the possible state of B having been avoided by the child performing A.  The attempt to make children feel regret can be seen as an inductive disciplinary technique in which the child’s own imaginative processes are used as a vehicle for teaching appropriate behavior.     
The question addressed in this paper is when children judge the counterfactual-based emotion of regret in others and experience it in themselves. There are three general reasons to be interested in whether young children judge regret in themselves and others. First, if children do not understand or experience regret, then adults’ attempts to induce it may be an ineffective means of having children learn from their mistakes. Second, anticipating and avoiding potential future regret has been shown to serve as an important basis by which adults regulate their own behavior (Amsel et al., in press; Bar-Hillel & Neter, 1996; Richard, van der Plift, & de Vries, 1996). If children do not judge regret in themselves or others, they will lack an important basis for self regulation. Finally, regret is an integral part of adults’ emotional experience of the world (Gilovich & Medvek, 1995).  Regret was expressed relatively frequently, second only to love in one self-report analysis among couples (Shimanoff, 1984). Thus, the failure to understand or experience counterfactual emotions would suggest that children’s emotional lives are notably different from that of adults. Taken together, these three reasons for studying the development of regret in children focuses attention on the importance of regret in the acquisition of social-emotional maturity.  
Regret, Disappointment and Guilt

The definition of regret refers in part to disappointment regarding one’s action or inaction, suggesting a commonality between the emotions. Both regret and disappointment involve experiencing sadness resulting from an actual state of affairs being negatively compared to a more desired but unrealized state. The commonality lies in both emotions being heavily influenced by cognitive operations of thinking about unrealized states of affairs and comparing those unrealized states to actual ones.  However, Zeelenberg, van Dijk, Manstead, & van der Pligt (1998) demonstrated that disappointment and regret are emotions that are different in important ways. They found that disappointment is triggered by actual states of affairs not living up to a person’s expectations, typically for reasons out of a person’s control. Dashed expectations are associated with a person feeling powerless and wanting to do nothing more than to remove himself or herself from the situation.  In contrast, Zeelenberg et al. (1988) found that regret involves focusing upon one’s role in a negative outcome by comparison of the actual state of affairs to ones which could have occurred had the person acted differently. Regrets are associated with strong feelings that one should have known better, thoughts that you have made a mistake, and motivations to get a second chance to undo the event. In this sense, regrets are opportunities to learn about how to handle the same situation again in the future.

Regret also appears to have commonalities with guilt. Guilt is a negative emotion associated with having acted or not acted in a manner that violated internal standards or codes of conduct (Ferguson & Stegge, 1995; Ferguson, Stegge, Miller, & Olsen, 1999). Thus, both guilt and regret involve cognitive operations of negatively comparing states of affairs which had been realized to ones which could have been (regret) or should have been (guilt) realized.  Despite these similarities, guilt and regret may be different both in triggering conditions and in consequences.  Guilt is associated with a sense of being responsible for and/or empathizing with the harm or pain others experience as a result of one’s actions, particularly those others with whom one has a significant social bond (Baumeister, 1998; Tangney, 1998).  Moreover, guilt is associated with a motivation to repair the damage to the other person involved in order to restore the relationship (Bybee, Merisca, & Velasco, 1998, Ferguson & Stegge, 1995).  Social relationships appear to play no special role in regret and, although one may ruminate about undoing regretted actions (Sherman & McConnell, 1995), regret is uniquely associated with no other reparative actions other than making sure that the regretted actions do not occur again (Amsel, Ferguson, & McVaugh, in preparation; Roseman, Weist, & Swartz, 1994).  While regret can be distinguished from guilt, the two emotional reactions remain strongly associated with each other among adults (Amsel, Ferguson, & McVaugh, in preparation).
In summary, disappointment, guilt, and regret are emotions in which actual states of affairs are negatively compared to those of unrealized alternative worlds; the world of expectations in the case of disappointment, the world of standards and codes in the case of guilt, and the world of possibilities in the case of regret.  There is abundant evidence that preschool children are emotionally influenced by the world of expectations.  Preschoolers feel sad when their expectations are violated, can explain why they feel sad, and even seek to control their expression of their disappointment (Cole, 1985; Cole, Zahn-Waxler, & Smith, 1994; Levine, 1994). Preschoolers are also influenced by standards and codes for behavior.  Observations suggest that 2-year-olds experience guilt in the sense of seeking reparation for breaking another’s toy (Barrett, Zahn-Waxler, & Cole, 1993), although an understanding of guilt as measured by verbal accounts may not be acquired until 8 years (Ferguson & Stegge, 1995).                   	Studying the Development of Counterfactual Emotions

While the review above suggests that regret can be isolated from other emotions, isolating it in an experimental procedure would require children to comprehend the differences between the emotional category labels of “regret”, “disappointment” and “guilt.” Such a procedure may confound evidence of young children’s linguistic skills with their experience of and capability to judge regret in others. Nonverbal or simplistic verbal assessments have been used reliably and successfully as an indirect measure of regret (c.f., Kahneman & Tversky, 1982; Medvec, Madey & Gilovich, 1995).  In these studies, regret is evidenced by a more negative emotional appraisal of protagonists (e.g., facial expression or global emotional assessment) who are entertaining counterfactual states of affairs that are more than less desired (e.g., a silver and bronze medalists who are respectively entertaining the possibility of have almost won gold or placed outside the medals).  However, such an indirect and global measurement procedure is not without risk of missing subtler aspects of the emotion (c.f., Connolly, Ordonez, & Coughlan, 1997; Ordonez & Connolly, 2000; Zeelenberg, van Dijk, & Manstead, 1998, 2000). 
Even with a more indirect and global measure of regret, it remains to be seen whether preschoolers’ emotional judgments and experiences are influenced by the possible world in the way they are by the worlds of expectations (disappointment) and of behavioral standards and codes (guilt). The possible world is defined as states of affairs which are known, believed, or presumed to be false but which could have been true.  The definition makes clear that the possible world is a potentially realizable (not merely fanciful) alternative to the states of affairs represented as true, whether the represented true world has occurred in the past, is occurring in the present, or is assumed to occur in the future.
While adopting an indirect measure of regret, the research design adopts a rigorous standard of evidence regarding whether children’s counterfactual thinking about possible worlds influences their emotional judgments. To demonstrate their experience or understanding of regret children had to predictably judge differences in an agent’s (self or other) feelings about (a) actual states of affairs and more or less desirable possible one and (b) actual state of affairs before and after discovering the desirability of the possible one.  The first component above requires the ability to represent plausible alternatives to real world states of affairs and to reason about an agent’s (self or other) feelings about those alternative states.  The second component involves the ability to bring judgments regarding the agent’s feelings about the plausible alternative states of affairs to bear when making judgments regarding his or her feelings about real world states of affairs.  
Previous developmental research on counterfactual reasoning has not as carefully distinguished between children’s ability to represent and reason about counterfactual states of affairs and to bring such analyses to bear on actual states of affair.  Typically developmental research addressing counterfactual reasoning has involved stories in which children are asked to judge about how an actual target event could have been different if there were a change in its antecedent (forward counterfactual reasoning) or its consequence (backward counterfactual thinking) (German, 1999; Guajardo & Turley-Ames, 1999, 2001; Harris, German & Mills, 1996; Riggs, Peterson, Robinson, & Mitchell, 1998; Robinson & Beck, 2000; Sobel, 2001).  However, demonstrating that children can make correct judgments about counterfactual states of affairs is not the same thing as demonstrating the impact of such thoughts on experiencing, understanding, or making judgments about actual states of affairs.  What is missing is evidence of a direct influence of entertaining counterfactual states of affairs on reasoning about actual ones.
The distinction between representing and reasoning about counterfactual states of affairs and bringing such knowledge to bear on actual states is critical to assess the impact of counterfactual thinking on emotional judgments.  It is insufficient to merely demonstrate that our sad soccer player who allowed a goal by playing out of position understands that he would have felt happier if only he played his position and not allowed the goal.  Such thoughts may reflect an inert emotional fantasy or daydream, limited to varying various features of reality, but with none of the adaptive learning functions associated with regret. For the fantasy to have real world emotional impact, our soccer player would have to demonstrate feeling worse about his poor play than he did before explicitly considering how the events (and his feelings) could have been otherwise.
Four studies were designed to assess preschoolers’ experience and judgment of not only regret but also elation.  Elation is a complementary emotion to the feeling of regret which also involves comparing actual states of affairs to possible alternative ones (Roese, 1997). Regret is the feeling resulting from comparing reality to thoughts about a better alternative states of affairs (so called “upward” counterfactual judgments) and elation is the feeling resulting from comparing reality to thoughts about a worse alternative states of affairs (“downward” counterfactual judgments; Roese, 1997).  

In each of the four studies, participants were asked an Initial Question about the happiness of an agent (self or other) regarding the consequence of having selected one of two options. For example, in Studies 1 and 2, agents selected and opened only one of two gift boxes and in Studies 3 and 4, agents turned over one of two face-down cards in a card game against an opponent who had been dealt a face-up card.  Then, the unselected option (gift box or card) was revealed and shown that it would have produced either a more or less desired consequence than the selected option. Upon revealing the unselected option, the participants were asked the Counterfactual Question about the feelings of the agent if the unselected option had actually been selected. Finally, participants were asked the Final Question, which was about the agent’s feeling about having chosen the selected option given the agent’s knowledge about the consequences of having chosen the unselected option.  
Evidence of preschoolers’ ability to represent and reason about the possible world (component (a) above) would entail them judging that the agents would have felt differently in response to the Initial and Counterfactual Questions.  Specifically, preschoolers would have to demonstrate an ability to judge that agents would have been happier with the more desired than the less desired unselected outcomes, compared to the outcomes which were selected. Evidence of preschoolers’ ability to bring the possible world to bear on their evaluation of the actual world (component (b) above) would entail them judging that the agent would have felt differently in response to the Initial than the Final Questions.  Specifically, preschoolers would have to judge that agents are sadder or happier about a selected outcome knowing that it is a (respectively) more or less desirable outcome in a situation, compared to having no knowledge about possible outcomes.
STUDY 1
Study 1 was a preliminary test of whether preschool-age children could judge regret and elation in others. The task was designed to distinguish two possible sources of difficulty:  the ability (a) to represent and reason about an agent’s feelings about possible states of affairs which are more or less desired than actual ones and (b) to bring judgments of an agent’s feelings about possible states of affair to bear on the agent’s feelings about actual states.

Method
Participants
Participants were 16 preschool children (M= 54 months, range=38 to 64 months; 6 males and 10 females) selected from a daycare situated in a moderately sized city in the northeast United States and 16 adults (M=34 years, range=18 to 72 years; 9 males; 7 females) from a moderately sized city in the western United Sates. The preschoolers were attending a laboratory daycare center of a small liberal arts college. All the children were of European-American descent, with eight of the preschoolers between 38- 54 months and eight between 57-64 months. All of the adults were also of European-American descent.  Eight of the adults were students at a public university situated in the western American city and the other eight adults were non-college educated acquaintances of the researcher from the same city.  
Procedure
A female or male experimenter led each participant to a table in a quiet room in the participant’s school or home where the participant and experimenter sat across from each other.  The experimenter introduced each participant to two dolls of the same sex as the participant.  Next to each doll were two gift boxes.  The experimenter explained that each protagonist had been good and that each was free to select one of the two gift boxes and keep whatever they found inside. The experimenter then explained that it was the participant’s job to figure out how the protagonists felt about their gift.  
Acting as if the protagonist had specified which box to select, the experimenter removed the top of the chosen box for each participant and placed its contents on the top of the box. When the protagonists’ chosen boxes were opened, they were shown to contain identical medium‑valued gifts.  For the children, the gift box contained a small plastic figurine judged by a pilot group of five children (from the same school as the participants) of the same age range and by teacher ratings to be more desirable than a wood block, but less desirable than the stickers.  For the adults the gift box contained a five dollar bill.  Money was used instead of toys for the adults to enhance the realism of the task for them.

Participants were then asked to rate the happiness of each protagonist regarding the content of the chosen gift box.  Participants rated each protagonist’s feeling on a four-point scale which was composed of drawings of four faces.  The face on the extreme left had no smile and was labeled as “not at all happy”(scored as 1), the adjacent face had a limited smile and was labeled as “a little happy” (scored as 2), to the right of that face was another one with a broader smile labeled as “pretty happy” (scored as 3), and the face on the extreme right had a very broad smile and was labeled as “very happy” (scored as 4).  After the scale was described to participants, they were asked the Initial Question:  “How happy is (naming one protagonist) with the gift she (he) received: Not at all happy, a little happy, pretty happy, or very happy?” 
Then, each participant was shown the contents of each protagonist's unchosen gift box. The top of the unchosen box was removed, but the contents remained in the box.  For the Positive Alternative Outcome condition the unchosen box was shown to contain a gift which had a higher value than the gift the protagonist actually received. The higher‑valued gift for children was a set of stickers and for adults it was a twenty dollar bill. For the Negative Alternative Outcome condition, the unchosen box contained a lower valued gift compared to the gift the protagonist actually received.  The lower valued gift for the children was a block, and for the adults it was a one dollar bill. For half the participants the higher valued alternative outcome (twenty dollar bill, stickers) was revealed first and for the other half, the lower valued alternative outcome (block, one dollar bill) was revealed first.  Participants in each age group were randomly assigned to conditions.
Upon revealing the unchosen box for a particular protagonist, participants rated the protagonist’s feelings about the gift they could have received. The Counterfactual Question asked of participants for each protagonist was: “How happy would (naming the protagonist) have been if she (he) had taken the other gift box: Not at all happy, a little happy, pretty happy, or very happy?”  This was the same four-point scale used for the assessing the Initial Question. The order of questions about each protagonist was the same for the Counterfactual Question as it was for the Initial Question. 
After the Counterfactual Question was asked for each protagonist, the participant’s memories for the protagonists' chosen and unchosen gifts were assessed.  Children were asked to identify the gift each protagonist actually received and they one they could have but did not receive.  Not only did this procedure serve as a memory check but also made clear to the participants that the protagonists also “knew” the contexts of each gift box.  All except one child answered correctly, and that child was corrected for two responses.  Then, participants were again asked about the feelings of each protagonist regarding the chosen gift. The Final Question asked of participants for each protagonist was:  “How happy is (naming one protagonist) now with the gift she (he) received: Not at all happy, a little happy, pretty happy, or very happy?” Again, the order of protagonist questioning remained the same as the Initial and Counterfactual Questions. The Final Question was merely a repeat of the Initial Question, but this time participants, along with protagonists, had knowledge of the alternative gift and whether or not the selected gift was the highest- or lowest-valued possible gift the protagonists could have had.  When the task was completed, participants were thanked for their participation and the children were given the stickers.  
Results
Children’s ratings of protagonist happiness were converted to a numerical score (from 1-4). Participants’ initial judgments were subjected to a 2 (Alternative Outcome: Most- or Least-Valued) by 2 (Age: Preschoolers or College students) mixed model ANOVA (with Alternative Outcome as the within-subjects variable) in order to test whether both groups judged the protagonists as equally happy, having received identical gifts. This was indeed the case as there were no statistically significant effects. As a result, two additional mixed model ANOVAs were performed on the data. 

The first ANOVA examined differences in children’s responses to the Initial and Counterfactual Questions.  This analysis assessed whether participants judged protagonists as feeling differently about the contents of the unchosen gift boxes compared to feelings about the one actually chosen.  A 2 (Question: Initial or Counterfactual) by 2 (Alternative Outcome: Positive or Negative) by 2 (Age Group: Preschoolers or Adults) mixed-model ANOVA (with Alternative Outcome and Question as repeated measures) revealed a significant main Alternative Outcome effect, F(1, 30)=13.05, p<.001, which was modified by a significant Alternative Outcome by Question interaction effect,  F(1, 30)=31.51, p<.001.  The significant interaction effect was due to the protagonist who could have had the Positive Alternative Outcome having been judged as happier than the protagonist could have had the Negative Alternative Outcome in response to the Counterfactual Question, t(31)=5.82, p<.001, but as equally happy in response to the Initial Question t(31)=.85, ns (see Table 1). This interaction effect occurred in each age group, as revealed by separate follow-up repeated measures ANOVAs on the Preschoolers’ data,  F(1, 15)=5.28, p<.05, and the Adult data, F(1, 15)=18.06, p<.001. 
___________________________
Insert Table 1 about here
___________________________  

Qualitative analysis further supports the notion that preschoolers performed just as well as adults when judging protagonists’ feelings about possible states of affairs.  A majority of preschoolers (69% over all with 63% of the younger and 75% of the older preschoolers) and adults (100%) judged the protagonist who could have had the Positive Alternative Outcome as happier than protagonist who could have had the Negative Alternative Outcome when asked the Counterfactual Question.  Sign tests were performed on the responses to the Counterfactual question, with 11 children judging the protagonist associated with the higher valued alternative outcome as happier than the protagonist associated with the lower valued alternative outcome and 3 children making the reverse judgment (1-tail Binomial p <.05) and all the adults judging the higher valued alternative outcome protagonist as happier than the lower valued alternative outcome protagonist (1-tail Binomial p <.001).
The second ANOVA examined differences in children responses to the Initial and Final Questions.  This analysis assessed whether participants judged protagonists as having felt differently about the contents of the chosen gift box in light of discovering the gift they could have had but did not choose.  A 2 (Question: Initial or Final) by 2 (Alternative Outcome) by 2 (Age Group) mixed-model ANOVA revealed a main effect of Alternative Outcome, F(1, 30) = 5.97, p<.05, two two-way interaction effects of Alternative Outcome by Group, F(1, 30) =7.51, p<.05 and Alternative Outcome by Question, F(1, 30) = 5.83, p<.05, and a Alternative Outcome, Group, and Question three-way interaction F(1, 30) = 16.19, p<.001.  Follow-up ANOVAS demonstrated significant main Alternative Outcome, F(1,15)=96.00, p<.001, and Alternative Outcome by Question interaction F(1, 15)=, p<.05, effects for the Adults but no significant effects for Preschoolers. Before learning about the unchosen gift, college students, like preschoolers, rated protagonists as equally happy with the identical gifts (Preschoolers, t(15)=.56, ns; Adults, t(15)=1.46, ns). But after discovering the unchosen gift, Adults but not Preschoolers, judged the protagonist who could have received the lower‑valued gift as happier than the protagonist who could have received the higher‑valued gift (Preschoolers, t(15)=1.39, vs; Adults, t(15)=7.31, p<.001) (see Table 2).
___________________________
Insert Table 2 about here
___________________________  

Qualitative analysis on the Final Question revealed that a majority of adults (88%) but only a minority of children (38% overall, with 25% of the younger and 50% of the older preschoolers) judged the protagonist associated with the negative alternative outcome as happier than the protagonist associated with the positive alternative outcome.  Sign Tests performed on responses to the Final Question showed that 6 children judged the negative alternative outcome protagonist as happier than the positive alternative outcome protagonist  and 7 children made the reverse judgment (Binomial p >.05, ns). In contrast 14 adults judged the negative alternative outcome protagonist as happier than positive alternative outcome protagonist and none judged it the other way (1-tail Binomial p <.001).  
Discussion
	The results suggest that young children represent and reason in an adult manner about protagonists' feelings about unrealized state of affairs which could have occurred. Children were like adults in correctly judging that, compared to the moderately valued gift in the chosen box, protagonists would have been happier if they had chosen the box containing the more valued gift and less happy if they had chosen the box containing the less valued gift.  The children’s competence in answering the memory questions is evidence that they understood the counterfactual question (and its subjunctive form) as about the option the protagonist did not receive (see Au, 1992 for a similar augment of young children’s ability to answer counterfactual questions despite not producing the grammatical form marking counterfactuality). 
Surprisingly though, children were not influenced by knowledge about what could have happened when making judgments about what has happened.  Only college students’ judgments of the protagonists’ feelings about the gift they actually received were influenced by judgments of the protagonists’ feelings about the gift they could have had.  

The finding that children readily represent and reason about possible states of affairs is significant in that it extends previous findings regarding children’s ability for counterfactual thinking.  Counterfactual thinking is the ability to imagine alternative, or counterfactual, versions of actual occurrences (Roese, 1997). Research has documented developmental changes in children’s ability to think counterfactually. Harris, Neave, and Philips (1995) found that 2- and 3-year-olds imagine the continuation of two protagonists’ actions in order to judge which one had almost completed or come closer to a target outcome.  Harris et al. (1996) also demonstrated that 3-year-olds could imagine how negative outcomes (dirtying a floor with muddy shoes) would or would not have been avoided if the protagonist had engaged in alternative causally-relevant (taking shoes off before entering the house) or causally-irrelevant (wearing blue rather than black shoes) activities.  By 4 or 5 years of age children become more flexible, mentally simulating a range of alternatives to states of affairs represented as true (Robinson & Beck, 2000), including ones in which an agent (self or other) holds false beliefs about the real world (Guajardo & Turley-Ames, 1999, 2001; Riggs, Peterson, Robinson, & Mitchell; 1998, Riggs & Peterson, 2000).  

Theoretical accounts of the change at 4 or 5 years in counterfactual reasoning has focused on (a) increases in children’s mental capacity to explicitly represent and reason about alternative realities (Robinson & Beck, 2000), (b) the acquisition of the ability to imagine other alternatives to reality than just ones involving negative outcomes (Harris & Levers, 2000), and (c) the acquisition of the capacity to reason about alternative states of affairs which are complete replacements of real world states, not just alternative antecedents or consequences (Perner, 2000).  The present findings regarding children’s reasoning about protagonists’ feelings had they chosen the unselected gift boxes can not easily be explained by these accounts.  Even the youngest of the preschoolers were as competent as older preschoolers and adults in explicitly considering the emotional consequences of more- and less-valued alternative possibilities of an actual state of affairs.  Despite correctly judging protagonists’ feelings had they chosen the unselected gift box, the children were uninfluenced by such knowledge in their judgments of protagonists’ actual feelings about the gift box they selected. That is, the children can create the counterfactual possibilities and reason systematically about them, but they seem to not appreciate the significance of such possibilities on their judgments about actual states of affairs.  Perhaps children can not or are just unwilling to bring knowledge about how someone could have felt to bear on judgments of how they actually feel. To children the possible world may be like the pretend world, each one being false and so distinct from and having no bearing on the real world (Amsel & Smalley, 2000).
However, before such a conclusion can be accepted, a number of alternative explanations for the children’s performance need to be ruled out.  First and foremost, differences between the age groups may have been an artifact of children and adults reasoning about protagonists receiving different gifts (money vs. toys).  More generally, children may have difficulty updating judgments of people’s emotional states in light of any sort of new information, whether factual or counterfactual.  These issues were addressed in Study 2.  
STUDY 2
Study 2 examined the influence of factual and counterfactual information on preschoolers' and adults’ judgments of protagonist happiness. As in Study 1, protagonists were shown selecting one of two boxes containing treats (gifts or desserts) and discovering the selected box contained a treat of medium value.  However, the children and adults were shown the same content.  After initial judgments of protagonist happiness regarding the selected treat, participants received additional counterfactual or factual information about the protagonist.  The counterfactual information was about the higher or lower valued treats the protagonists could have but did not select. The factual information was about the protagonists’ level of satiation with the selected treat. 

Information about level of satiation specified how recently a protagonist had last eaten (dessert) or played with (gift) the treat.  Such information does not specifically describe or refer to protagonists’ desire for the treat, but has been shown to influence judgments about such desires (Gopnik & Slaughter, 1992).  In this sense, the factual and counterfactual information was designed to function in the same manner--to influence participants’ judgments of protagonists’ feelings about a state of affairs without directly referring to protagonists’ mental or psychological states.  This allows for a fair comparison between factual and counterfactual information on judgments of emotion.  However, no attempt was made to equate factual and counterfactual information in terms of salience or impact and so no direct comparison of the influence of each type of information was made.  It was predicted that college students but not preschoolers would alter their initial judgments of protagonist happiness regarding receiving a treat (dessert or gift) when given additional counterfactual information.  However, it was predicted that the initial judgments of both groups would be influenced by additional factual information regarding protagonists’ level of satiation with the treat.
Method
Participants
Twenty‑six preschoolers (38‑62 months, 12 females, 14 males) and 24 college students (12 females and 12 males) were participants in the study.  The preschoolers were sampled from the same college nursery school as the children in Study 1.  No child was in both studies.  The college students were enrolled in a summer research program in the school to which the nursery school was affiliated.  The students included psychology majors and those in other disciplines. 
Procedure

 A male experimenter led each participant to a table in a quiet room in the protagonist’s school where the child and experimenter sat across from each other.  The experimenter introduced each participant to four dolls of the same sex as the participant, one doll at a time.  Each protagonist was described as having been good and being allowed by his or her teacher to choose between two boxes that each contained a treat which they could keep.  The experimenter then explained that it was the participants’ job to figure out each protagonist’s feelings about his or her gift.  
The first doll was placed alone on the table next to two gift boxes. The experimenter, acting as if directed by the doll, selected one of the two gift boxes and opened it.  The contents were revealed as one of two medium‑valued treats; either a gift (e.g., a figurine) or a dessert (e.g., fruit).  Pilot testing with five children and five college students at the same nursery school or college these treats intermediate between gifts and desserts of low value (block and cracker) or high value (stickers and cake).  The college students were given the same story and treat content as the children, but they were additionally told that the researcher wanted to examine how adults respond on a reasoning task that was designed for children.   The adults were told to reason for themselves and not as they thought children would reason.  
Two questions regarding each protagonist was asked before continuing to the next protagonist.  The Initial Question requested that participants judge how happy each protagonist was with the selected treat on the four-point scale used in Study 1 (Not at all happy, a little happy, pretty happy, or very happy).  They were asked: “How happy is (naming the protagonist) with the treat she (he) received: Not at all happy, a little happy, pretty happy, or very happy?” 

Upon answering the Initial Question, participants were randomly assigned to receive either factual or counterfactual information regarding each protagonist. Half the participants in each age group received counterfactual information for each protagonist, which involved revealing the contents of the protagonists’ unselected boxes.  The counterfactual information given two of the four protagonists (one of which had received a figurine and one a fruit) was positive, designed to increase judgments of protagonist happiness about having received the treat.  For the other two protagonists, the information was negative, designed to lower participants’ initial ratings^2. The positive counterfactual information involved revealing that the unselected gift box contained a lower‑valued treat (e.g., a block or a cracker) and the negative counterfactual information involved revealing that the unselected gift box contained a higher‑valued treat, (e.g., stickers or a piece of cake).

The other half of the participants received factual information concerning the  protagonist’s level of satiation for the treat--not having eaten/played with the treat for a long time or having just eaten/played with the treat.  The factual information given about two of the four protagonists (one of which had received a figurine and one a fruit) was positive, designed to increase participants’ initial judgments of protagonist happiness.  The positive factual information provided about the protagonist given a figurine was that the protagonist had not played with the figurine for a long time and the positive factual information given about the protagonist given a fruit was that the protagonist had not eaten fruit for a long time. For the other two protagonists, the factual information was negative, meant to decrease judgments of protagonist happiness about having received the treat.  Participants given negative factual information were told that the protagonist given a figurine had just played a lot with the same figurine and the protagonist given a fruit had just eaten a lot of fruit. 
Following the presentation of the factual or counterfactual additional information, the participants were asked again for their judgment of protagonist happiness regarding the treat protagonists actually received, in light of the one they could have had.  The Final Question was a repeat of the Initial Question:  “How happy is (naming the protagonist) with the treat she (he) received: Not happy or sad, a little happy, pretty happy, or very happy?” 
All participants received information about the two protagonists receiving figurines as gifts and two received fruit as desserts consecutively.  Half the participants in each age group had the two protagonists receive figurines first and half had protagonists receive fruit first. As noted, the order of presenting the factual or counterfactual information foist for the first pairs of protagonists was counterbalanced over participants, as was the order of presenting positive or negative information first.  As a result, 8 groups were formed, composed of approximately 3 participants in each age group.  The eight groups included participants (a) given factual or counterfactual information, (b) receiving the dessert or gift outcome first, and (c) provided with positive or negative information first.  
Results

Participants’ judgments of protagonist happiness were converted to a numerical score (from 1-4) and averaged over the two treats (dessert or gift).  Then responses to the Initial Question were subjected to a 2 (Condition: Factual or Counterfactual) by 2 (Information: Positive or Negative) by 2 (Age: Preschoolers or College students) mixed-model, repeated measures ANOVA with Condition and Information as the repeated measure.  As in Study 1, this was done in order to assess whether participants initially judged the protagonists as equally happy. In this case, the children (M=3.11) judged the protagonists happier than did the adults (M=2.80), F(1,46)=4.23, p<.05. Because of the differences between groups in initial judgments of protagonist happiness, an ANCOVA technique was used to analyze the data.  In these analyses, judgments on the Initial Question served as the covariate for the comparison of participants’ responses on the Final Question, thereby equating the groups.  
Two ANCOVAs were run on the data, one on participants’ responses given factual information and one for counterfactual information.  Two separate analyses of the influence of factual and counterfactual information were run out of a concern that the two types of information were not equated for salience or impact. 	
The first analysis was a 2 (Age Group) by 2 (Information: Positive or Negative) mixed model ANCOVA of responses given to counterfactual information. Information was the repeated measure and response to the Initial Question was the covariate.  The results revealed a significant Information main effect F(1,23)=16.95, p<.01 and a significant Information by Age Group interaction effect F(1,23)=5.95, p<.05 (see Table 3). The results suggest that College Students, but not Preschoolers, judged the protagonist whose alternative gift selection would have led to the less valued treat (Info + under Counterfactual Condition in Table 3) as happier than the protagonist whose alternative gift selection would have led to the more valued gift (Info – under Counterfactual Condition).  Simple Effects analysis confirmed this, with College Students demonstrating the Information effect F(1,23)=21.34, p<.001, but not preschoolers,  F(1,23)=1.17, ns.  Qualitative analyses also indicate a discontinuity between preschoolers and college students in the influence of counterfactual information on judgments of protagonist affect.  A total of 6 of the 14 (43%) preschoolers rated as happier the protagonist who could have had a less valued than more valued treat with 3 (21%) preschoolers doing the opposite (1-tail binomial p, ns).  In contrast, 11 of 12 college students rated the protagonists who chose the best treat as happier than the other protagonist and none did the reverse (1-tailed binomial p<.01)
___________________________
Insert Table 3 about here
___________________________

The second 2 (Age Group) by 2 (Protagonist:  Positive or Negative) repeated measures mixed model ANCOVA was performed on responses given to factual information. The results revealed a significant main Protagonist effect F(1,21)=17.30, p<.001, but not a significant  Protagonist by Age Group interaction effect F(1,21)=1.97, ns (see Table 3). Both College Students and Preschoolers judged the unsatiated protagonist (Info + under Factual Condition in Table 3) as happier then the satiated one (Info – under Factual Condition).  Simple Effects analysis revealed a significant Protagonist effect among College Students, F(1,21)=15.47, p<.001, and an effect which approached significance among Preschoolers, F(1,21)=3.78, p=.065.
Qualitative analyses support the quantitative ones suggesting continuity among preschoolers and college students in their assessments of the feelings of protagonists in light of factual information.  A total of  7 of the 12 (58%) preschoolers and 11 out of 12 (92%) college students rated the unsatiatied protagonist as happier about the treat than the satiated one, with one preschooler and one adult doing the opposite (Preschoolers’ 1-tailed binomial p<.05, College Students 1-tailed binomial p<.01,)
Discussion
Study 2 tested the possibility that the results of Study 1 were an artifact of the fact that children reasoned about different types of gifts than adults and may be more reluctant than them to update their judgments of emotional happiness in light of any information, factual or counterfactual.  The results of Study 2 replicated those of Study 1 with regard to the influence of counterfactual information on preschoolers’ judgments of protagonist happiness. Preschoolers showed no influence of counterfactual information on their judgments of protagonist happiness.  The story was different when considering the influence of factual information on children’s and adults’ judgments of protagonist happiness.  Although the influence of factual information on preschooler’s judgments only approached significance in the Simple Effects analysis, there was no Protagonist by Age interaction effect on the influence of factual information as there was for counterfactual information.  Moreover, the sign test also revealed that preschoolers and adults demonstrated a similar influence (albeit different in degree) of factual information on affective judgments.  Thus, factual information had a similar albeit not an identical influence on children’s and adults’ judgments of protagonist happiness.  

The differential influence of factual and counterfactual information on preschoolers’ happiness judgments in Study 2 is sufficient to conclude that children are not simply reluctant to update their judgments of emotional happiness in light of new information.  This leaves open the explanation of why children are uninfluenced by counterfactual information in Studies 1 and 2.  Another possible explanation of the difference between children and adults in the influence of counterfactual information may be associated with having made judgments of other people’s happiness. Perhaps, if children were playing a game to win a desired outcome, their feelings may be more palpable, and so accessible, upon discovering that they could have but did not win (regret) or that they won but could have lost (elation).  This was tested in Study 3.
STUDY 3
Study 3 tested children’s experience of their own regret and elation in a card game in which they could win stickers, a highly valued reward. Children aged 5 years, 7 years, and 10 years old and college students played a card game against an experimenter using a deck of cards that portrayed values from zero to five.  The experimenter was dealt one face-up card and participants were given two face-down cards.  Participants turned over one face-down card and if it was higher than the experimenter’s, the protagonist would win the hand and be awarded with the stickers.

To test for children’s feelings of regret and elation, the hands were rigged so that one of the participants’ two face-down cards matched the experimenter’s face-up card and the other card was either higher or lower than the experimenter’s card. An experimental trial for a participant consisted of the participant turning over the card which tied the experimenter’s. Each participant had two experimental trials, one in which the unselected card would have won the hand and one in which it would have lost. On each experimental trial, participants were asked about their feeling about having turned over the selected card before and after revealing the card they could have but did not select.  Participants’ experience of regret and elation would be demonstrated by them becoming sadder or happier regarding the card they actually turned over (which tied the experimenter) after finding out about a winning or losing card they could have turned over.
Method
Participants
A total of 55 participants were interviewed: 14 preschoolers (42-67 months, 7 males and 7 females), 15 2^nd graders (7- and 8-years-old, 8 males, 7 females), 16 5^th graders (10- and 11-years-old, 10 males and 6 females), and 10 college students (5 male and 5 females).  The preschoolers were attending a college nursery school.  Our sample reflected the school demographics of students who were mostly of European American descent and largely middle class.  The elementary school students were sampled from a public school serving a community of families mostly of European American descent and largely middle class.  The college students were Intro Psychology students who received extra credit for the involvement.  
Procedure
Each participant played a card game with the experimenter in which they could win stickers if they drew the card with the highest value. A male or female experimenter led each participant to a table in a quiet room in the protagonists school where the child and experimenter sat across from each other.  Preschoolers were then pretested to be sure that they understood the value of cards.  The cards were made from 4" x 6" inch pieces of laminated cardboard with from zero to five animal stickers on them and the number of stickers written on the top left and bottom right of each card.  Each card value had a different animal sticker.  The 0, 3, and 5 cards were presented to the preschoolers who had to identify the value.  One preschooler was dropped for not answering the pretest questions.

All participants were then told that they were going to play a card game, shown the cards, and familiarized with the emotion scale.  The scale had three faces, which, from left to right, included a frowning face (designated as “sad”), a neutral face (designated as “not happy or sad”), and a smiling face (designated as “happy”). To be sure that the participants understood the card game and the use of the emotion scale, a practice game was played.  In the practice game, the experimenter dealt himself or herself one face-up card and the participant was dealt one face-down card.  The participant then turned over his or her card and if it beat the experimenter’s card, the participant would win the stickers that had been placed on the table. Three hands were played during the practice game: One in which the participant won, one in which the experimenter won, and one which was a tie.  Upon turning over their card, participants were asked about the outcome “Who won: Me, you, or no one?” and about their feelings, “How do you feel about the card you turned over: Happy, sad, or not happy or sad [while pointing to the appropriate faces]?” Incorrect responses to the outcome question were corrected, and children were retested, and if they incorrectly answered the same practice hand again, they were dropped from the study.  Participants’ emotion judgments were not corrected. One preschool and one second grade student were dropped because they treated the tied hand as one they had won (they are not included in the description of the sample).

For the experimental task, stickers were placed on the table between the experimenter and participant, participants were dealt two face-down cards which were placed directly in front of them, and the experimenter was dealt a face-up card. The game was rigged so that one of the participant’s face-down cards “tied” the experimenter’s and the other was either higher or lower than the experimenter’s. Participants were invited to turn over one of the two cards. Only if the participant turned over the card which tied the experimenter’s was the hand treated as an experimental trial. Participants played until two trials were complete, one in which the unchosen card would have won the hand (Positive Alternative Outcome), and one in which the unchosen card would have lost the hand (Negative Alternative Outcome).
 When a participant turned over the card, it was placed in front of him or her, and the unchosen card was moved to the side. Then, participants were quizzed about the outcome (“Who won: Me, you, or no one?”).  The stickers were given to the winner or remained in the center of the table if the hand was tied.  If the chosen card tied the experimenter’s card, a series of questions were posed, beginning with the Initial Question:  “How do you feel about the card you turned over? Happy, sad, or not happy or sad?” The question was asked while the experimenter pointed to corresponding faces on the emotion scale.  Then the participant’s unchosen card was turned over, “to see what would have happened if you turned it over instead of the one you actually turned over.” Upon turning over the unselected card, each participant was asked about what would have occurred had the unselected card been actually chosen.  They were asked: “Who would have won if you turned over this card [experimenter points to the unchosen card] instead of the one you did turn over [experimenter points to the chosen card].” Incorrect answers were recorded but then corrected to clarify any confusion about the outcome. Then the Counterfactual Question was posed: “How would you have felt if you had turned over the unchosen card? Happy, sad, or not happy or sad?”   One kindergarten and one 2^nd grade student gave no response to the counterfactual question.

After answering the counterfactual question, the unchosen card was turned face-down again.  Then the Final Question was asked: “How do you feel now about the card you turned over? Happy, sad, or not happy or sad?”  The wording of the Final Question was designed to be slightly different than the Initial Question, by adding and emphasizing the word “now.” The purpose of this was twofold.  First, making the final question different than the initial one avoids posing exactly the same question to children on two occasions, which may make children hesitant to change their answer.  Second, it was thought that emphasizing the word “now” in the final question would permit children to change their answer.  After answering the final question, ten preschoolers were asked to remember the value of unselected card, which had been turned over.  This was done to be sure that children had not forgotten the value of the unselected card, Nine children remembered it for both hands, and one forgot the value of the card on one hand. However, the preschooler had correctly remembered the card as being higher than the selected card.   
Results
For each question the emotion ratings were coded numerically, with a “happy” rating coded as 1, “not happy or sad” as 0, and “sad” as -1. Responses to the Initial Questions were then subjected to a 4 (Age Group: Preschool, 2^nd Grade, 5^th Grade, or College Students) by 2 (Alternative Outcome: Positive or Negative) repeated measure, mixed model ANOVA to assess whether initial emotion judgments about having tied the experimenter were the same for participants in all groups.   There were no significant main or interaction effects in the analysis of initial emotion judgments.

Two additional 4 (Age Group) by 2 (Alternative Outcome), by 2 (Question:  Initial and either Counterfactual or Final) mixed-model ANOVAs (with repeated measures on the Alternative Outcome and Question) were run.  The first ANOVA compared emotion ratings in response to the Initial and Counterfactual Questions.  There was only a significant main Question by Alternative Outcome interaction effect, F(1,49)=93.22, p<.001, which simple effects analysis revealed was significant in each age group, Preschoolers, F(1,49)=15.42, p<.001; 2^nd Grade, F(1,49)=21.69, p<.001; 5^th Grade F(1,49)=18.98, p<.001; and College Students, F(1,49)=38.43, p<.001. As suggested in Table 4, the interaction effect was due to there being no overall difference in mean emotion ratings in response to the Initial Question for the two different outcomes, t(54)=.49, ns) but there was a significant difference in response to the Counterfactual Question, t(52)=11.01, p<.001.  Participants judged that they would have felt happier (M=.91, a score significantly higher than 0, t(52)=22.34, p<.001) had they turned over a winning card (Positive Alternative Outcome) instead of the card they did turn over which tied the experimenter, and sadder (M= -.36, a score significantly lower than 0, t(52)=3.68, p<.001) had they turned over a losing card (Negative Alternative Outcome) instead of the card which tied.
___________________________
Insert Table 4 about here
___________________________  

Qualitative analyses also demonstrated that children and adults alike judged that they would have been happier if they had turned over a winning instead of a losing card.  A total of 62% of preschoolers, 79% of 2^nd graders, 81% of 5^th graders, and 100% of college students judged themselves as happier on the rating scale if they had turned over a winning instead of a losing card, with only one 5^th grader judging himself as happier had he turned over a losing than a winning card.  A Sign Tests at each age group revealed a significant tendency for participants to judge that they would have felt happier had they turned over a winning card (all 1-tailed, binomial ps <.01).
The second 4 by 2 by 2 mixed model ANOVA compared participants emotion ratings in response to the Initial and Final Questions (2) by Age Group (4) and Alternative Outcome (2).  There was a significant Alternative Outcome main effect, F(1,51)=54.05, p<.001, due to participants judging themselves happier overall if they tied a hand that they could have lost (M=.47) compared to one that could have won (M=-.06).  This was qualified by significant Question by Outcome, F(1,51)=63.18, p<.001, and a Age Group by Question by Outcome, F(3,51)=5.18, p<.01) interaction effect.  Simple Effects analyses demonstrated a significant Question by Outcome interaction effect for 2^nd graders, F(1,51)=14.99, p<.001, 5^th graders  F(1,51)=19.45, p<.001, and college students,  F(1,51)=37.66, p<.001, but not for preschoolers,  F(1,51)=1.39, ns (See Table 5). The 2^nd-grade, 5^th-grade and college student groups rated themselves as happier about the card they actually turned over (M=.85, a value significantly higher than 0, t(40)=15.28, p<.001) if the unselected card would have lost the hand (Negative Alternative Outcome) and sadder about the card they actually turned over (M=-.44, a value significantly below 0, t(40)=15.28, p<.001) if the unselected card would have won the hand (Positive Alternative Outcome) .  
___________________________
Insert Table 5 about here
___________________________  

The qualitative analyses also demonstrated that preschoolers were different than the older children and adults in the influence of counterfactual information on their emotion judgments about themselves.  A total of 87% of 2^nd-graders, 69% of 5^th-graders, and 100% of college students judged themselves as happier on the final question about the selected card (which tied the experimenter) given the other card would have lost compared to when it would have won, with no student in any of these older age groups judging themselves as sadder (Sign Tests, 1-tailed binomial ps <.001). In contrast, only 36% of the preschoolers judged themselves as happier about their selected card on the final question given that the unselected card would have lost compared to when it would have won the hand, with one person making the opposite judgment (1-tailed binomial p, ns).
Discussion
Study 3 was designed to test whether preschoolers experience regret and elation in themselves where they fail to judge it in others.  It was thought that the experience of regret and elation in oneself than their judgments in others might be a more sensitive measure of preschoolers ability to be influenced by their representation and reasoning about the possibilities. For the most part, the results of the present study suggest that preschoolers were uninfluenced in their feelings about actual states of affairs by information they readily understood about the alternative possible states.  
The present study allows for the exclusion of other arguments suggesting that the finding is a methodological artifact.  First, the possibility that children may be reluctant to change their emotional appraisal to the same question can not be sustained since the language of the Initial and Final Question was different and the language of the Final Question seemed to actually invite a different appraisal than that of the first.

Second, children’s performance on the Final Question was not due to a misunderstanding of the value of the unrealized possibility set up in the experimental task. Children were asked about the counterfactual outcome and corrected for any misunderstanding they may have had.  This minimized any errors or confusions when judgments were made about the possible states of affairs.  No preschooler in Study 3 judged that they would have been happier had they turned over the card which would have lost the hand (Negative Alternative Outcome) than won it (Positive Alternative Outcome).  In contrast, three preschoolers in Study 1 and three in Study 2 judged that the protagonist who could have had the less-valued gift or treat would have been happier than the protagonist who could have had the more valued one.
Third, preschoolers’ performance on the Final Question was not due to a lack of interest in the outcome.  That is, while preschoolers may be indifferent to others receiving a medium valued gift when other possibilities existed, it is not the case that preschoolers were indifferent to having a hand which tied the experimenter.  Perhaps more than any other group, they wanted the stickers and, as their responses to the counterfactual question suggest, they knew they would have felt happy if they had selected the winning card and sad if they had selected the losing one.

One implication of the present finding is that judgments of regret in self and others may emerge together. The emergence for self and other of correct judgments regarding false beliefs was evidence to argue that a conceptual insight was the basis for understanding of mind (Gopnik & Astington, 1988; Wimmer & Hartl, 1992).  The same argument regarding the evidence can be applied here. Barring any methodological artifact accounting for the preschoolers’ performance, the evidence that feelings of regret and elation in self and others emerge together beyond the preschool years supports the claim that preschoolers are unable, unwilling, or ignorant of the value of bring the possible world to bear on their emotional judgments of real world states of affairs. Study 4 was a specific test of whether self and other judgments do indeed emerge together in groups of preschool and kindergarten students.
STUDY 4
In this study, preschool, kindergarten, and college students made judgments of regret and elation about self and others on the same task. The goal was to examine whether the emotions first appear in reference to oneself, others, or both simultaneously.  The task was the same card game used in Study 3, except that this time, participants played against Billie the Bird (a stuffed animal) and not the experimenter.  A stuffed animal was used because it did not reveal any facial expressions that could be used by the participants to infer their opponents’ internal states and the opponent is not an adult figure about whom children may feel uncomfortable judging negative emotions.  
More hands were played in Study 4 than Study 3 in order to improve the reliability of the measure of children’s feelings.  Children played at least 8 hands, 4 in which they received two face-down cards and selected one and 4 in which Billie received two face-down cards and selected one. In all 8 hands, participants were queried about an agent’s (their own or Billie’s) feelings about the selected card before and after discovering the value of the unselected card. The cards were rigged so that the two face-down cards dealt to the participant or to Billie included one winner and one loser. Participants were questioned about their own or Billie’s feelings about having won when they could have lost, or having lost when they could have won. As in Study 3, the Initial and Final questions were different.  The Initial Question focused on the feelings of the agent (self or Billie) about having won or lost, and the Final Question focused on direction in which (if at all) the agent’s feelings were altered by discovering the value of the unselected card.  	In 4 of 8 hands, participants judged their own feelings about having won when they could have lost (2 hands) or having lost when they could have won (2 hands).  Similarly, in the other 4 hands, participants judged Billie’s feelings about having won when it could have lost (2 hands) or having lost when it could have won (2 hands).  It was predicted that children’s judgments of counterfactual regret and elation in self and others would appear simultaneously, reflecting a conceptual insight about these counterfactual emotions.  The prediction is based on Wimmer’s and Hartl’s (1991) claim that the simultaneous appreciation of false beliefs in self and others reflects children’s conceptual insight about mental states.
Method
Participants
Fourteen preschool (M=4.4 years, 6 females, 8 males), 16 kindergarten (M=5.6 years, 8 girls and 8 males), and 16 college students (8 males and 8 females) completed the study.  The students sampled were each very reflective of the predominately Caucasian, middle class, European American communities these institutions serve.
Procedure 

Participants were led to a quiet room in their school and directed to sit across from the experimenter at a table. Each participant was introduced to "Billie the Bird," a fluffy, soft, stuffed animal, which was propped up on the table facing the child. The children were given a two‑phase pretest. The first phase assessed whether children would judge that psychological expectations can intensify feelings of happiness and sadness. The judgment parallels the one participants would make in the experimental task, so it seemed prudent to identify those participants who were reluctant to make emotion judgments.  This first pretest task involved two pretend scenarios.  In the first one, children were told, "Imagine Billie got a present.  How would he feel: happy, sad, or not happy or sad?" By way of clarifying these emotions, the experimenter pointed to each of three simple facial expressions (happy, neutral, and sad) on an appropriately drawn scale (the initial scale). A child's correct response to this question involved pointing to the correct facial expression (the happy face). Children who responded verbally were prompted to point to the relevant face to avoid confusion in the next question: "You said Billie was happy about getting a present. Now let's say that when he opened the present, he found it was better than what he expected it to be. Would Billie be happier than before, the same as before, or less happy than before?" As this question was asked, the experimenter flipped a screen over the initial scale of faces. This screen was designed to block all but the happy face, which was visible through a hole cut in the screen. On either side of the hole through which the original happy face appeared, were drawn two more faces: a happier face, and a less happy face. This created a separate scale, comprised of varying degrees of happiness. A child's correct response to this question consisted of pointing to the happier face. 

Then the child was given another pretend scenario, this time involving Billie hurting his finger. Children were told, "Imagine Billie hurt his finger.  How would he feel: happy, sad, or not happy or sad?  Going back to the initial scale, a child's correct response was to point to the sad face. The experimenter, using the same phrasing as before, this time described how “Billie’s ‘boo‑boo’ or ‘owee’ really hurt a lot, more than he expected it to hurt.” This time a separate screen was flipped over the sad face, creating another separate scale, this time depicting varying degrees of sadness (the sadness scale). The child was asked whether Billie would be "sadder than before, the same as before, or happier than before," the correct response this time being the sadder face.  Only those who judged that emotions may be intensified by a state of affairs being better or worse than expected were included in the study.
The second phase of the pretest assessed all participants’ ability to play the card game.  Each participant was told that Billie wanted to play a card game with him/her. The deck, which was that used in Study 3, was described.  As in Study 3, the youngest children were again probed for their understanding of the differences in value of the cards. Two hands were played: One which the participant won and another which Billie won.  As in Study 3, participants judged the outcome (and were corrected if wrong) and their feelings about having won or lost (not corrected). This pretest continued until the participant answered both questions correctly.  Seven children (5 preschool and 2 kindergarten students) were excluded from the study, as their competency with judging emotional change (pretest 1), comparing numbers, or understanding of the game (pretest 2) was in doubt.
The experimental trials consisted of participants playing at least 8 hands of a card game against “Billie the Bird.”  In 4 “self” trials, participants got two face‑down cards, selected one to turn over, and compared the selected card to Billie’s face-up card. In each trial, one face-down card won and the other lost.  These hands were played until there were two trials in which participants selected the winning card and two in which they selected the losing one.  The 4 “other” trials were similar except that Billie received the two face-down cards, and the experimenter (acting as if directed by Billie) turned over a selected card.  The order of self and other trials was counterbalanced over participants in each age group.  

Upon revealing the selected card, three questions were posed to participants.  The Initial Question was posed immediately after one face-down card was turned over by the participant or Billie, and the participant correctly determined who had won. Participants were asked: “How do you (does Billie) feel about having turned over this card: Happy, sad, or not happy or sad?”  The question was posed while the experimenter pointed to the corresponding face on the scale.  
Once Billie’s or the participant’s unselected card was turned over, the Counterfactual Question was posed.  Participants were asked: “Who would have won the sticker if you (Billie) had turned over this card instead of the one you (Billie) actually turned over: Billie, you, or no one?”  A question about counterfactual outcomes was posed in Study 4 instead of the agent’s feeling about those outcomes (as was posed in Studies 1 and 3) for two reasons.  First, it was unnecessary since preschoolers already demonstrated clearly in Studies 1 and 3 that they correctly judge their own and others’ feelings about possible states of affairs.  Second, since the Final question involves children judging the extent of emotional change, it was thought that an additional emotion judgment would only complicate matters.  Errors children made in response to the Counterfactual Question were recorded and then corrected.

After answering the Counterfactual Question, the unselected card was turned back over  and the Final Question was posed.  The appropriate screen was placed over the emotion scale, adding drawings of more and less intense expressions of happiness or sadness depending on whether the participant had said the agent (self or other) was initially happy or sad.  Participants were asked: “Remember you said you were (Billie was) happy/sad about turning over this [the selected] card? Well, now that you've (Billie has) seen the other card, how do you (Billie) feel about the card you (he) selected? Do you feel happier/ sadder than before, the same as before, or less happy/sad than before?”  The terms expressing level of happiness (happier or less happy) or sadness (sadder or less sad) were used depending on the initial judgment.  The order of posing these options to participants always had the “same as before” option as the second one mentioned.  The order of mentioning the more extreme (sadder or happier than before) and less extreme (less sad or happy than before) options was counterbalanced across subjects and alternated over trials. This counterbalancing and alternating of order of mention was considered very important as the most extreme option was always correct.  The counterbalancing resulted in 4 groups in each age group composed of those who (a) received the self or other trials first and (b) those whose first trial had the correct option to the final question mentioned first or last.
Results and Discussion
Each response was scored as 1 if it was as predicted. Predicted for the Initial Question were judgments for self and other of happy if the selected card won the hand and sad if it lost. Predicted for the Counterfactual Question were judgments for self and other that the agent (Billie or participant) associated with higher unselected card, would have won. Predicted for the Final Question were judgments for self and other of the agent being judged as happier if the hand won, but could have lost, and sadder if the hand lost, but could have won.  Two analyses were performed on the data.  

The first analysis examined age changes in performance on each question. For each question, six or more (out of 8) predicted responses (binomial p<.05) was defined as correct. Table 6 presents the frequency and percentages, by age group, of participants who answered each question correctly. All participants answered the initial question correctly.  This is not surprising because participants simply judged that an agent who won a hand and was awarded stickers was happy and an agent who lost a hand and was not awarded stickers was sad. The Counterfactual Question requested participants to judge what would have occurred if the agent (self or other) had turned over the other card.  Nearly all the participants in each age group answered the counterfactual question correctly (see Table 6). A Chi-square test by age on the number of participants who answered the Counterfactual Question correctly was not significant, X^2(2)=4.65, ns.  These results parallel those from Studies 1 and 3 which also found that a majority of preschoolers correctly answered the Counterfactual Question. The Final Question assessed whether information about the unselected card influenced participants’ judgments of how agents (self and other) felt about the card they had turned over. Specifically, participants were assessed for whether or not they would judge an agent as feeling happier than they initially felt about having won the hand because the unselected card would have lost the hand (elation) or feeling sadder than they initially felt about having lost the hand because the unselected card would have won it (regret).  As can be seen in Table 6, only a minority of preschoolers (36%), but a majority of kindergarten (63%) students made correct judgments. A chi-square test by age of the percentage of participants who answered the Final Question correctly was significant, X^2(2)=13.66, p<.01.  The results parallel the findings in Studies 1 and 3, which also found that a minority of preschoolers made correct judgments on the final question.  The present findings suggest that very few preschoolers judge themselves or others as experiencing regret or elation in situations that most college and many kindergarten students do.  The data from Study 4, perhaps the most reliable report because of the multiple trials, suggest that regret and elation are not judged in other and experienced in self until at least 5 or 6 years of age. 	
____________________________
Place Table 6 about here
____________________________  

The second analysis assessed the relation between performance on the self and other trials among the two groups of children. Children who responded as predicted on the Final Question on each of the 4 Self trials were coded as having responded correctly (4 out of 4, binomial p<.01).  The same coding procedure was then applied to the 4 Other trials.  A total of 87% of the children responded consistently on Self and Other trials (26/30) with 10 children responding correctly on both self and other trials and 16 responding correctly on neither one.  Of the 4 children who responded inconsistently, 3 responded correctly on Self but not Other trials, and 1 child responded correctly on Other but not Self trials.  Contingency analysis of the distribution of children responding correctly and incorrectly revealed that judgments of regret and elation for self and others emerged together, X^2(2)=13.10, p<.001 (continuity corrected).  
The simultaneous emergence in self and other suggests that the development of regret and elation may depend on children’s insight about the nature of these feeling.  The insight goes beyond simply appreciating that additional psychological information may intensify emotions, since all children passed the pretest where this knowledge was tested. Instead, it is proposed that young children gain insight, over time, about the value and significance of bringing knowledge about the possible world to bear on assessments of an agent’s feelings about the real world (Amsel & Smalley, 2000).
General Discussion

Two components were identified as central for children to experience regret in themselves and judging it in others.  The first was the ability to represent and reason about agents’ feelings regarding unrealized possibilities (i.e., unrealized states of affairs which could have been), and the second was being influence by thoughts of these possible states of affairs when judgments are made about the actual ones.  In each of the present studies in which it was tested (Studies 1, 3 and 4), a majority of preschoolers demonstrated adult-like ability to represent and reason about possible states of affairs. The percentage of adult-like performance ranged from 62% in Study 3, which solicited preschoolers’ judgments of their own feelings regarding having turned over the unselected card, to 87% in Study 4, which solicited preschoolers’ judgments of the consequence of an agent (self or other) having turned over an unselected card. Although there are too many differences in procedure between Studies 3 and 4 to make meaningful comparisons between them, one thing they had in common is a good deal of children’s interest and engagement in the tasks.  Because of the nature of the game, the preschoolers had an interest in the card they or others chose to turn over and the one they chose not to turn over. Such active interest and engagement in a task has been shown to promote children’s reasoning on the false belief tasks (Chandler & Hala, 1994; Sullivan & Winner, 1993).  This and the fact that the present tasks were set up with only one specific alternative outcome to consider may be an important part of the explanation of why children performed so much better on the counterfactual questions posed on these tasks than on other counterfactual thinking tasks which constrain possibilities to a lesser extent (Guajardo & Turley-Ames, 1999, 2001; Perner, 2000; Riggs, Peterson, Robinson, & Mitchell, 1998, Riggs & Peterson, 2000; Robinson & Beck, 2000). 

Despite the ability to represent and reason about possible states of affairs, few preschoolers were influenced by them in their judgments of agents’ feelings about actual states.  In Studies 1, 2, and 3, information regarding possible states of affairs were shown to have no quantitative influence on preschoolers’ assessments of agents’ feelings.   In Studies 1, 3, and 4, few preschoolers were shown to be influenced by information regarding possible states of affairs.  The percentage of preschoolers whose judgments were consistent with being influenced by possible states of affairs on their judgments about agents’ actual feelings ranged from 36% in Studies 3 and 4 to 38% in Study 1.  The narrow range obtained despite concerted efforts to rule out potential extraneous variables which would explain the children’s performance as a methodological artifact. 
The conclusion that young children have limited ability to judge regret and elation in others or experience it in themselves appears to be able to stand up to standard methodological concerns that seem to arise whenever it is claimed children can not perform in some manner.   One such concern is that young children’s poor performance on a task is due to them being asked linguistically complex questions.  But such a criticism does not apply in the present study because the children were merely asked how an agent felt about winning or losing a hand in a card game or about receiving a medium-valued gift. Indeed, preschool-aged children readily understood the linguistically complex Counterfactual Question which was posed in the subjunctive mood and is not produced by children until well into the elementary school years (Au, 1991).  

Another standard methodological concern is that young children’s poor performance on a task is an artifact of a confusing or complicated task.  Perhaps children were confused about the status of alternative outcomes as “possible ones” and so were uninfluenced by them. Any confusions about the status of alternative outcomes as “possibilities” were corrected in Studies 3 and 4 and still children were not influenced by them.  Furthermore, concerns about the difficulties children may have had in updating their emotion judgments in light of new information were tested and dismissed in Studies 2 and 4.  In Study 2, children were shown to be influenced by factual but not counterfactual information in their emotion judgments.  In Study 4, children were pretested for their tendency to be influenced by expectancy information when making emotion judgments.  Study 4 additionally allows the dismissal of the concern that children’s insensitivity to possible outcomes are due to a general insensitivity to psychologically-relevant information in their judgments of emotions.  Finally, children performed similarly despite making the Final Question not at all (Study 1 and 2) a little (Study 3) or a lot (Study 4) different from the Initial Question.

It remains a possibility, as one reviewer put it, “that children might adjust their ratings if their attention was really drawn to the link between what they chose and what they could have chosen.”  But even if such a procedure would work, it calls into question why young children fail to do spontaneously what seems so automatic and effortless in adults:  Realizing that how one thinks and feels is relative to a set of possible alternatives being considered at a given time.  Rather than a methodological artifact, we propose that the data regarding young children’s tendency to not judge regret or elation in themselves or others can be explained by children being unwilling, unable, or ignoring the value of bringing information about possibilities to bear on the evaluation of actualities. The proposal is a domain-general one, suggesting that preschoolers’ judgments regarding any actual state of affairs are not influenced by information regarding possible ones.  However, this conclusion conflicts with Harris et al. (1996), who claimed that 3- and 4-year-olds’ causal attributions are influenced by counterfactual thoughts about possible states of affairs. Causal attributions are as much about real world states of affairs as are experiences of regret, and counterfactual thinking has been claimed to be a basis for such attributions (Amsel, Brock, & Loutzenhiser, 1991; Tversky & Kanheman, 1982; Wells & Gavanski, 1989). Harris et al. presented preschoolers with stories about protagonists whose actions (playing with a black pen) produced negative outcomes (inky fingers). The protagonist was described as having considered but rejected another course of action which would have either avoided the negative outcome (playing with a pencil) or not (playing with a blue pen).  Children were then asked how the negative outcome could have been avoided (Avoidance Question) and what had caused the negative outcome (Causal Question).  Children correctly identified the course of action which would have avoided the negative outcome a majority of the time in response to the Avoidance Question, but only 27% of the time in response to the Causal Question (see Amsel & Smalley, 2000, for a complete critique). Rather than conflicting with the present proposal, then, the Harris et al.’s data may be taken in support the claim that only a minority of preschool-aged children are influenced about possible states of affairs in their judgments regarding actual (i.e., causal) ones, although a majority of them represent and reason about possible (i.e., avoidable) states.  Of course, the issue of the domain generality of this difficulty remains speculative and will only be resolved by future research which carefully distinguishes between representing and reasoning about counterfactual states of affairs, and bring that knowledge to bear on actual ones.   
The present data add to evidence suggesting that during the preschool years, children are acquiring a more coherent and complete understanding of the distinction between states of affairs represented as true, whether they are perceived directly or indirectly, and those represented as false, whether they are pretend, imagined or possible states of affairs (see reviews by Woolley, 1995, 1998,  Bouchier & Davis, 2002, although see deRivera & Sarbin, 1999, for views denying that the distinction is ever very coherent or complete). Nonetheless, the present data present a more complicated picture of the growth in children’s understanding the distinction.  The present data suggest that young preschoolers have different difficulties in reasoning about the pretend or imagined states of affairs on the one hand and possible ones on the other. Preschoolers’ difficulty with reasoning about the pretend or imagined world lies in failing to inhibit bringing false states of affairs to bear on judgments regarding the real world.  That is, preschoolers make judgments of reality which have been inappropriately influenced by having previously engaged in pretend or imaginary activities (e.g., Amsel, Bobadilla, Coch, & Remy, 1996; Bouchier & Davis, 2002).  By 4 years, children tend not to be influenced by mundane imagined or pretended states of affairs when evaluating real ones, although there may still be circumstances in which pretend or imagined worlds are perceptually or emotionally salient (Amsel et al., 1998; Harris, 2000; Harris et al., 1991).  In contrast, the present data suggest that the difficulty preschoolers have reasoning about the possible world lies in failing to bring false (possible but unrealized) states of affairs to bear on judgments regarding the real world. That is, preschoolers make judgments of reality which are inappropriately uninfluenced by possible states of affairs.  Possible states of affairs only influence real world judgments after the preschool years
To account for this asymmetry, the representations of real and fiction states of affairs must be seen not only as distinguished from each other, but also as related (Amsel & Smalley, 2000; Fouconnier, 1985; Gerrig & Pillow, 1998).  Amsel and Smalley (2000) characterize this as mentally coordinating representations of true and fictional states of affairs.  In the case of pretense, the coordination entails creating a physical or mental mapping between the elements in the true and fictional representations and shifting between them (Amsel et al., 1996; Amsel & Smalley, 2000). However, judging regret or elation in self or other involves forming both a referential and causal link between the true and fictional representations.  The referential link involves appreciating that fictional states of affairs are about represented real world states of affairs (see, Perner, 2000; Amsel, Triofi & Martin, 2003) whereas the causal link enables representations of real states events to be influenced or altered by fictional worlds. 

Interestingly, reasoning about false beliefs involves a link between fictional and true representations that is referential but not causal.  Put differently, an agent (self or other) holding a false belief must be conceived of as representing a fictional world (i.e., the world an agent mistakenly believes in) which refers to represented states of affairs in the real world but does not influence or alter those represented real world states.  The same kind of correspondence between true and fictional states of affairs necessary for reasoning about false beliefs would also apply to evaluating counterfactual statements, such as those posed to children by Guajardo and Turley-Ames, (1999; 2001), Riggs, Peterson, Robinson, and Mitchell (1998), and Riggs and Peterson (2000). Evaluating questions about a situation which would have obtained if some other event had not happened involves representing and making judgments of a fictional world which refers to representations of real world states of affairs.  However, such reasoning does not involve influencing or altering those real world representations.  

In summary, it is proposed that there is growth not only in children’s conceptual differentiation between representations of true and fictional states of affairs but also in their coordination of them. By 2 years of age, children form simple mappings from elements in true to fictional representations and can shift between them, which is sufficient for pretending or imagining a fictional world which corresponds to the true world.  By approximately 4 years of age, children additionally form referential links between true and fictional representations which is sufficient to form false representations which are about the true states.  Reasoning about one’s own or others’ falsely believed and counterfactual states of affairs would require the formation of these referential links between fictional and true states of affairs, which can explain why performance on these reasoning tasks is correlated (Guajardo & Turley-Ames, 1999, 2001; Riggs, Peterson, Robinson, & Mitchell; 1998, Riggs & Peterson, 2000; Robinson & Beck, 2000).  The formation of these referential links may be promoted by children’s active engagement in a task which would help make such links salient. The present data would suggest such an effect occurs for counterfactual thinking tasks and not just false belief tasks (Chandler & Hala, 1994; Sullivan & Winner, 1993).  Finally, by 5 or 6 years of age, children can form causal links between fictional and true representations, which permit bringing fictional states of affair to bear on true states.  Research is underway to test this model by further examining the influence of counterfactual information in the development of children’s causal and emotion judgments.
Finally, the present findings suggest that attempts to regulate preschool children’s behavior by inducing regret in them may be ineffective.  For example, the soccer coach described in the opening of this paper may have been ineffective when trying to induce regret in the four-year-old defender who played out of position. While the child may be able to imagine having played his position and the goal not being scored, it is unlikely that the child would feel any worse about his performance than he did before imagining such a possibility. However, this does not mean that such attempts are without emotional impact on the child. Despite not feeling regret over his behavior, the child may readily decode and feel guilty about the disappointment on the coach’s face. As previously noted, guilt and regret are similar in that they both involve negatively comparing states of affairs which have been realized to ones which could have been (regret) or should have been (guilt) realized. Among adults, regret has been shown to be an important part of the experience of guilt (Amsel, Ferguson, & McVaugh, in preparation; Niedenthal, Tangney, & Gavanski, 1994), perhaps as when one laments about how one could have engaged in the behavior that one should have engaged in.  Such a lament could later function as a strategy for behavior in a similar situation. However, such a relation between guilt and regret may emerge only gradually over childhood and adolescence (Amsel et al., in press; Bybee, 1998), leaving young children (such as the four-old soccer player) who lack an understanding of regret or its relation to guilt, learning little from situations about which they feel guilty. 

References
Amsel, E., Langer, R., & Loutzenhiser, L.  (1991). Do lawyers reason differently from psychologists? A comparative design for studying expertise.  In R.J. Sternberg & P. Frensch (Eds.),  Complex problem solving:  Mechanisms and processes (pp. 223-250).  Hillsdale, NJ:  Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.
Amsel, E., Bobadilla, W., Coch, D., & Remy, R. (1996). Young children’s memory for the true and pretend identities of objects used in object-substitution pretense. Developmental Psychology, 32, 479-491.
Amsel, E., Foulkes, S., Gilmore, B, Smalley, D.J., & Volpe, H.  (1998, July).  Preschoolers’ reasoning about pretend and possible worlds. Paper presented at the biennial meeting of the International Society for the Study of Behavioral Development, Berne, Switzerland.
Amsel, E., Cottrell, J., Sullivan, J., & Bowden, T. (in press). Anticipating and avoiding
regret as a model of adolescent decision-making. In J. Jacobs & P. Klaczynski, (Eds.) The
development of decision-making: Cognitive, sociocultural, and legal perspectives. Mahwah, NJ: Erlbaum. 
Amsel, E., & Smalley, J. (2000). Beyond really and truly: Children’s counterfactual thinking about pretend and possible worlds. In K. Riggs & P. Mitchell (Eds.), Children’s reasoning and the mind (pp. 99-134). Brighton, UK: Psychology Press.
Amsel, E., Trionfi, G., & Martin, V. (2003, June). Ontology and the construction of purposes: A developmental account of pretending and hypothesizing. Paper presented at the 31^st Annual Symposium of the Jean Piaget Society, Chicago IL.
Amsel, E., Ferguson, T., & McVaugh, W.  (in preparation).  The nature of regret and its relation 
to shame and guilt.  
Au, T. (1992).  Counterfactual reasoning.  In G.R. Semin & K. Fiedler (Eds.),  Language, interaction, and social cognition (pp. 194-213). Newbury Park, CA: Sage Publications.  
Bar-Hillel, M. & Neter, E. (1996).  Why are people reluctant to exchange lottery tickets?  Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 70 17-27. 

Barrett, K.C., Zahn-Waxler, C., & Cole, P.M. (1993).  Avoiders vs..amenders -- Implications for the investigations of guilt and shame during toddlerhood.  Cognition and Emotion.  7, 481-505.  
Baumeister, (1998).  Inducing guilt.  In J. Bybee (Ed.) Guilt in children (pp. 127-138). San Diego, CA: Academic Press. 
Bouchier, A., & Davis, A. (2002).  Children’s understanding of the pretence-reality distinction:  
	A review of current theory and evidence.  Developmental Science, 5, 397–426.
Bybee. J. (1998). The emergence of gender differences in guilt during adolescence.  In J. Bybee  (Ed.) Guilt in children (pp. 113-124). San Diego, CA: Academic Press. 
Bybee, J., Merisca, R. & Velasco, R.  (1998). The development of reactions to guilt-producing events (pp. 185-213).  In J. Bybee (Ed.) Guilt in children. San Diego, CA: Academic Press. 
Chandler, M. &  Hala, S. (1994).  The role of personal involvement in the assessment of early false belief skills. In C. Lewis and P. Mitchell (Eds.), Children’s early understanding of mind: Origins and development (pp. 403-425). Hove UK: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.
Cole, P.M. (1985).  Children’s spontaneous control of facial expression.  Child Development, 57, 1309-1321.
Cole, P.M., Zahn-Waxler, C. & Smith, D.K. (1994).  Expressive control during disappointment: Variations related to preschoolers’ behavior problems.  Developmental Psychology, 30, 835-846.  
Connolly, T., Ordonez, L.D., Coughlan, R. (1997).  Regret and responsibility in the evaluation of decision outcomes. Organizational Behavior & Human Decision Processes, 70, 73-85.
de Rivera J. & Sarbin, T.R.  (1998). Believed-in imaginings: The narrative construction of reality.  Washington DC: APA Press. 
Ferguson T.J. & Stegge, H. (1995).  Emotional states and traits in children: The case of shame and guilt (pp. 174-197).  In J.P. Tangney & K.W. Fischer (Eds.)  Self-conscious emotions. New York, NY: Guilford Press. 
Ferguson T.J. & Stegge, H. Miller, E. R., & Olsen, M.E. (1999). Guilt, shame, and symptoms in children.  Developmental Psychology, 35, 347-357
Fouconnier, G.  (1985).  Mental spaces: Aspects of meaning construction in natural language..   New York, NY: Cambridge University Press..
Garner, P.W. & Power, T.G. (1996). Preschoolers' emotional control in the disappointment paradigm and its relation to temperament, emotional knowledge, and family expressiveness.  Child Development, 67, 1406‑1419.
German, T.  (1999). Children’s causal reasoning:  Counterfactual thinking occurs for “negative” outcomes only.  Developmental Science, 2, 442-447. 
Gerrig, R.J. & Pillow, B. (1998).  A developmental perspective on the construction of disbelief.  In J. de Rivera & T.R. Sarbin (Eds.)  Believed-in imaginings: The narrative construction of reality (pp. 101-119).  Washington DC: APA Press. 
Gilovitch, T., & Medvec, V.H. (1995).  The experience of regret: What, when, and why.  Psychological Review, 102, 379-395. 
Gleicher, F., Kost, K.A., Baker, S.M., Strathman, A.J., Richman, S.A., & Sherman, S.J. (1990).  The role of counterfactual reasoning in judgments of affect.  Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 16, 284-295. 
Gopnik, A., & Astington, J.W.  (1988). Children's understanding of representational change and 
its relation to the understanding of false belief and the appearance-reality distinction. Child Development, 59, 26-37. 
Gopnik, A., & Slaughter, V. (1991). Young children's understanding of changes in their mental states. Child Development, 62, 89-109.
Guajardo, N. & Turley-Ames, K.J.   (1999, April).   Social cognitive development: Theory of mind and counterfactual thinking.  Presented at the biennial meeting of Society of Research in Child Development, Albuquerque, NM.
Guajardo, N. R., & Turley-Ames, K. J. (2001, April). Theory of mind and counterfactual thinking: Mutating the antecedent vs. the consequent. Paper presented at the 2001 Biennial meeting of the Society for Research in Child Development, Minneapolis, MN.
Harris, P. (2000).  The work of the imagination.  Oxford, UK:  Blackwell. 
Harris P., & Levers, H.  (2000).  The development of reasoning with false premises.  In K. Riggs & P. Mitchell (Eds.), Childrens reasoning and the mind (pp. 67-86). Brighton, UK: Psychology Press.
Harris, P., Brown, E., Marriot, C., Whittall, S., & Harmer, S. (1991). Monsters, ghosts, & witches:  Testing the limits of the fantasy-reality distinction in young children. British Journal of Developmental Psychology, 9, 105-123.

Harris, P.L., German, T., & Mills, P.  (1996). Children’s use of counterfactual thinking in causal reasoning. Cognition, 61, 233-259.
Harris, P.L., Neave, E., & Philips, N.J.  (1995). Talking about outcomes that almost happen.  Polish Journal of Psychology.  
Kahneman, D., & Tversky. A. (1982).  The simulation heuristic.  In D. Kahneman, P. Slovic, & A. Tversky (Eds.), Judgment under uncertainty: Heuristics and biases (pp. 201-208).  New York: Cambridge University Press. 
Kahneman D., & Miller, D.T.  (1986). Norm theory, Comparing reality to its alternatives.  Psychological Review, 93, 136-153. 
Landman, J.  (1987). Regret and elation following action and inaction: Affective responses to positive and negative outcomes.  Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 13, 524-536.
Levine, L. J. (1995) Young children's understanding of the causes of anger and sadness. Child Development, 66, 697‑709. 
Medvec, V., Madey, S., & Gilovich, T.  (1995). When less is more: Counterfactual thinking among Olympic medalists. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 69, 603-610.
Neidenthal, P., Tangney, J.P., & Gavanski, I.  (1994).  “If only I weren’t” versus “if only I hadn’t”: Distinguishing shame and guilt in counterfactual thinking.  Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 67, 585-595.
Ordonez, L..; Connolly, T.  (2000). Regret and responsibility: A reply to Zeelenberg et al. (1998). Organizational Behavior & Human Decision Processes. 81(1), 132-142. 
Perner, J. (2000)  About + belief + counterfactual. In K. Riggs & P. Mitchell (Eds.), Children’s Reasoning and the Mind (pp. 367-401). Brighton, UK: Psychology Press.

Richard, R. van der Plift, J. & de Vries, N. (1996). Anticipated regret and time perspective: Changing sexual risk-taking behavior.  Journal of Behavioral Decision Making, 9, 185-199.  
Riggs, K. J., Peterson, D. M., Robinson, E. J., & Mitchell, P. (1998). Are errors in false belief tasks symptomatic of a broader difficulty with counterfactuality? Cognitive Development, 13, 73-90.
Riggs K.J., & Peterson, D.M. (2000).  Counterfactual thinking in preschool children: mental state and causal inferences. in K. Riggs & P. Mitchell (Eds.), Children’s reasoning and the mind (pp. 87-99). Brighton, UK: Psychology Press.
Robinson E.J., & Beck, S.  (2000).  What is difficult about counterfactual reasoning? In K. Riggs & P. Mitchell (Eds.), Children’s Reasoning and the Mind (pp. 101-119). Brighton, UK: Psychology Press.
Roese, N. J. (1994). The functional basis of counterfactual thinking. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 66, 805-818.
Roese, N. (1997).  Counterfactual thinking.  Psychological Bulletin, 121, 133-148.
Roseman, I., Weist, C., & Swartz, T.S. (1994).  Phenomenology, behaviors, and goals differentiate discrete emotions. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 67, 206-221.
Sherman, S.J., & McConnell, A.R. (1995).  Dysfunctional implications of counterfactual thinking:  When alternatives to reality fail us.  In N.J. Roese & J.M. Olson (Eds.) What might have been: The social psychology of counterfactual thinking (pp. 199-231).  Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.  .  
Shimanoff, S.B. (1984).  Commonly named emotions in everyday conversations.  Perceptual and Motor Skills, 58, 514.
Sobel, D.M.  (2001, April).  On the coherence of young children’s causal reasoning: Evidence from counterfactuals. Paper presented at the Biennial meeting of the Society for Research in Child Development, Minneapolis, MN.
Sullivan, K., & Winner, E. (1993). Three‑year‑olds' understanding of mental states: The influence of trickery.   Journal of Experimental Child Psychology, 56 135‑148

Tangney, J.P.  (1988). How does guilt differ from shame?  In J. Bybee (Ed.) Guilt in children (pp. 1-18). San Diego, CA: Academic Press. 
Wells, G., & Gavanski, I.  (1989). Mental simulation of causality.  Journal of Social and Personality Psychology, 56, 161-169.
Wimmer, H., Hartl, M. (1991).  Against the Cartesian view on mind: Young children’s difficulty with own false beliefs. British Journal of Developmental Psychology, 9, 125-138.
Woolley, J.D. (1995).  The fictional mind: Young children’s understanding of imagination, pretense, and dreams.  Developmental Review, 15, 172-211.
Woolley, J.D. (1997).  Thinking about fantasy: Are children fundamentally different thinkers and believers from adults?  Child Development, 68, 991-1011.
Zeelenberg, M. (1999). The use of crying over spilled milk: A note on the rationality and functionality of regret.   Philosophical Psychology, 12, 325‑340
Zeelenberg, M., van‑Dijk, W.W., Manstead, A.S.R., van‑der‑Pligt, J. (1998).  The experience of regret and disappointment.  Cognition and Emotion, 12, 221‑230.
Zeelenberg, M., van Dijk, W. W., & Manstead, A. S. R. (1998). Reconsidering the relation between regret and responsibility. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 74, 254–272.
Zeelenberg, M., van Dijk, W. W., & Manstead, A. S. R. (2000). Regret and responsibility resolved? Evaluating Ordonez and Connolly’s (2000) conclusions. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 81,143–154

Table 1
Happiness ratings by on the Initial and Counterfactual Questions by Protagonist, and Age Group, Study 1
______________________________________________________________________________
Negative Alternative  		 	Positive Alternative
        Outcome				         Outcome
(Block or $1.00)		         	(Stickers or $20.00)
________________________	________________________
Age Group	n		Initial		Counterfactual		Initial 		Counterfactual
______________________________________________________________________________
Preschool	16		3.19^a			2.25		2.94			3.25 
1.22^b			1.13  		1.12			1.13 
Adult		16		2.75	        		1.56		2.63	        		3.56
  .68	        		  .51		  .72	        		  .51
______________________________________________________________________________
a  Mean Happiness rating
b  Standard Deviation 

Table 2 
Happiness ratings on the Initial and Final Questions by Alternative Outcome, and Age Group, Study 1
______________________________________________________________________________
Negative Alternative  		 	Positive Alternative
        Outcome				         Outcome
   (Block or $1.00)			(Stickers or $20.00)
_________________			__________________
Age Group		n		Initial	        	  Final			Initial	  	 Final
______________________________________________________________________________
Preschool		16		3.19^a	      	  2.75			2.94		  2.94
1.22^b		  1.24  			1.13		   1.12
Adult			16		2.75		  3.44			2.63		   1.56
  .68		    .51			  .72		     .73
______________________________________________________________________________
a  Mean Happiness rating
b  Standard Deviation 

Table 3
Final Happiness ratings by Condition (Factual vs. Counterfactual), Information, and Age Group, Study 2
_____________________________________________________________________________
       Factual					Counterfactual
________________________		________________________
Age Group		n	Info +	    	Info -			n	Info +		Info -
______________________________________________________________________________
Preschool		12	3.58^a	   	2.92			14	3.00		2.61
  .93^b		1.04				1.00		 .86
College		12	3.38	   	2.04			12	3.29		1.83
   .53		  .50				  .62		  .65
______________________________________________________________________________
Note:  Info was information designed to increase (+) or decrease (-) participants’ final judgments by making the protagonist appear unsatiated or satiated with the chosen treat (factual) or the treat being more or less desired than its alternative (counterfactual).  
a  Mean Happiness rating
b  Standard Deviation 

Table 4
Ratings on the Initial and Counterfactual Questions by Alternative Outcome and Age Group, Study 3
______________________________________________________________________________
Positive Alternative Outcome		Negative Alternative Outcome
________________________	________________________
Age Group	n		Initial	      	Counterfactual		Initial		Counterfactual
______________________________________________________________________________
Preschool	13		 0.15^a	      		0.85		  0.31			 0.00
   .90^b			  .38  		    .75			   .71 
2^nd Graders	14		 0.21			0.93		  0.21			-0.21
   .43	      		  .27	               .70	  		  .70 
5^th Graders	16		  0.44			0.88		 0.19			-0.38
    .51			  .34		   .66			   .72
Adult		10		 0.00	        	            1.00		-0.20	        		-1.00
   .81	        		  .00		   .92	        		   .00
______________________________________________________________________________
Note: One preschool and one second grade student did not answer a counterfactual question so they were dropped from this analysis.
a  Mean judgment from -1 (sad) to 1 (happy)
b  Standard Deviation

Table 5
Ratings on the Initial and Final Questions by Alternative Outcome and Age Group, Study 3
______________________________________________________________________________
Positive Alternative Outcome		Negative Alternative Outcome
________________________	________________________
Age Group	n		Initial			Final		Initial 			Final
______________________________________________________________________________
Preschool	14		  0.07^a			 0.00		 0.29			 0.57
   .92^b			   .96  		   .73			  .65 
2^nd Graders	15		 0.20			-0.33		 0.20			 0.80
    .41			   .49		   .68	  		  .41  
5^th Graders	16		  0.44			-0.19		  0.19			 0.81
    .51			   .75		   .66			  .40
Adult		10		 0.00	        		-1.00		-0.20		        	1.00
   		   .82			   .00		   .92	        	 	  .00     
______________________________________________________________________________
a  Mean judgment from -1 (sad) to 1 (happy)
b  Standard Deviation

Table 6
Percentage of Participants Responding Correctly by Age Group and Question, Study 4
_____________________________________________________________________________
Question
___________________________________________
Age Group		n		Initial		     Counterfactual		Final
_____________________________________________________________________________
Preschool		14		100			  86			  36
Kindergarten		16		100			100 			  63
Adult			16		100			100			100